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Half-Time at the Antitrust Modernization
Commission
By ALBERT A. FOER*
As I WRITE IN THE LATE FALL of 2005, and edit in the late winter
of 2006, the Antitrust Modernization Commission ("AMC" or "Com-
mission") has lived approximately one-half of its statutory three-year
life. We cannot yet predict what the AMC will report to Congress and
the President in April 2007, but much can be said about what plays
have been called in the first half and what is potentially at stake in the
game. In this Article, I begin by describing the origins and structure of
the AMC in Part I, briefly placing it into the context of previous blue
ribbon antitrust study commissions. Part II depicts the AMC's accom-
plishments during the first half of its life, focusing on self-organiza-
tion, the development of an agenda, and the various efforts to solicit
information and advice from the public. Part III looks forward to the
second half of the AMC's term, outlining what remains to be done
and how the Commission is likely to go about doing it, with particular
attention to seven substantive controversies. The Article concludes
with a discussion of the factors that will determine whether the Com-
mission's three years of labor will matter.
I. The Rule Book
The AMC is the brainchild of F. James Sensenbrenner, a Republi-
can Member of Congress from Wisconsin who had recently become
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee when he introduced
H.R. 2325 in 2001.1 No hearings were held on the bill, and it was
generally assumed to be going nowhere. At the last minute Chairman
Sensenbrenner attached it to an appropriations bill, and it sailed
* Albert A. Foer (A.B., Brandeis University; M.A., Washington University; J.D.,
University of Chicago) is the founder and President of the American Antitrust Institute, an
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www.antitrustinstitute.org.
1. SeeJaret Sieberg, Bill Proposes Review of Antitrust Laws, DEAL, Jun. 27, 2001, available
at http://www.thedeal.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=TheDeal/TDDArticle/
StandardArticle&bn=NULL&c=TDDArticle&cid=1003865119187 (available by subscription
only) (copy on file with author).
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through unopposed-although without noticeable support from any-
one other than the Chairman.2 The law therefore has no legislative
history to speak of.
Sensenbrenner himself talked about the need to study the inter-
sections of antitrust and (1) high technology, (2) intellectual prop-
erty, and (3) international law.3 However, the legislation does not
address which specific topics the AMC should take up. Rather, it sets
forth four specific duties:
(1) to examine whether the need exists to modernize the antitrust
laws and to identify and study related issues; (2) to solicit views of
all parties concerned with the operation of the antitrust laws; (3) to
evaluate the advisability of proposals and current arrangements
with respect to any issues so identified; and (4) to prepare and to
submit to Congress and the President a report [("the Report")].4
The AMC has twelve members who were appointed by the Presi-
dent, the Senate, and the House, with an equal mix of Republicans
and Democrats. 5 Before appointing members, the appointers were re-
quired to consult with each other "to ensure fair and equitable repre-
sentation of various points of view in the Commission."6 However,
there is no evidence that such a consultation occurred. In fact, it
would be difficult to say that there are any Commissioners who re-
present the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") or the Antitrust Divi-
sion, 7 the states, consumers, small business, or the plaintiffs' bar, to
name but a few obviously missing stakeholders. While some of the
Commissioners, or the firms that employ them, occasionally represent
plaintiffs, and some of the Commissioners served in enforcement
posts earlier in their careers, the Commission as a whole-while made
2. Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002 ("The Act"), Pub. L. No. 107-
273, §§ 11051-60, 116 Stat. 1856 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 note). The Act is subtitle
D of the 21st Century Department ofJustice Appropriations Act and was passed on Novem-
ber 2, 2002.
3. See Sieberg, supra note 1.
4. Antitrust Modernization Commission Act §11053.
5. Four members were appointed by the President (two having to come from the
"opposition party"); two by the Majority Leader of the Senate; two by the Minority Leader
of the Senate; two by the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and two by the Minority
Leader of the House. Id. § 11054.
6. Id. § 11054(h).
7. When they were appointed, Makan Delrahim worked in the Senate and Deborah
Majoras was in private practice. Delrahim subsequently became Deputy Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust, but in Fall 2005 joined a Washington, D.C. law firm. Majoras was
required to step down from the AMC when she was appointed Chair of the FTC. Several
Commissioners had earlier high-level experiences in the two federal antitrust agencies.
Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Commissioners & Commission Staff Bios, http://www.
amc.gov/bios.htm [hereinafter AMC Staff Bios] (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
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up of esteemed and experienced antitrust experts-is dominated by
people whose recent backgrounds strongly suggest a defense
orientation. 8
In an article drafted before the Commissioners were appointed, I
offered four generalizations to be gleaned from the statutory frame-
work of the AMC.9 First, because the statute provided almost no direc-
tion, it would be up to the Commission to define its own scope and
priorities.10 Second, whether Congress would achieve its objective of a
politically balanced and broadly representative Commission would de-
pend as much on the appointments of staff and expert consultants as
8. The Commissioners and their affiliations are: Deborah A. Garza (Chair) (Fried,
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, Washington, D.C.; former Chief of Staff in the Antitrust
Division), Jonathan R. Yarowsky (Vice Chair) (Patton, Boggs, Washington, D.C. office; for-
mer General Counsel to the House Judiciary Committee), Bobby R. Burchfield (McDer-
mott, Will & Emory, Washington, D.C.; replaced Deborah Majoras (Jones Day,
Washington, D.C.) after she was appointed to be Chair of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion)), W. Stephen Cannon (Constantine Cannon, Washington, D.C.; former General
Counsel to Circuit City with substantial experience in the Antitrust Division and the Senate
Judiciary Committee), Dennis W. Carlton (Economist, University of Chicago; Senior Man-
aging Director, Lexecon, which-like the large law firms-most often represents large cor-
porate antitrust defendants), Makan Delrahim (appointed while Chief Counsel to the
Senate Judiciary Committee, but has since been Deputy Assistant Attorney General for An-
titrust and is now with Brownstein, Hyatt & Farber, Washington, D.C.), Jonathan M. Jacob-
son (appointed while at Akin Gump et al., but now at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati,
New York), Donald G. Kempf, Jr. (appointed while Executive Vice President, Morgan Stan-
ley, New York), Sanford M. Litvack (Hogan & Hartson in Los Angeles; former Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust),John H. Shenefield (Morgan Lewis & Bockius in Washing-
ton, D.C.; former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust), Debra A. Valentine (Vice Presi-
dent, United Technologies; former General Counsel, FTC), and John L. Warden (Sullivan
and Cromwell, New York). The Republican appointees are Cannon, Delrahim, Kempf, and
Warden. Democratic appointees are Jacobson, Shenefield, Yarowsky, and Valentine. Presi-
dential appointees are Garza, Carlton, Litvack, and Majoras (replaced by Burchfeld) (Carl-
ton and Litvack represent the "opposition party"). Biographical information is available on
the AMC website. See AMC Staff Bios, supra note 7.
A Washington Post article hinted at close relations between several of the Commission-
ers and the Microsoft Corporation and concluded, "The makeup of the panel and the
questions it is examining, however, suggest that most of the focus will be on the needs of
antitrust defendants, or potential defendants." Jonathan Krim, A Less-Public Path to Changes
in Antitrust, WASH. PosT, May 12, 2005, at El, available at http://www.ffhsj.com/antitrust/
pdf/alertl 10901 .pdf.
9. Albert A. Foer, Putting the Antitrust Modernization Commission into Perspective, 51
BuFF. L. REv. 1029, 1031-32 (2003) [hereinafter Foer, Perspective]. This article attempted to
suggest what could be learned from important predecessor blue ribbon antitrust study
commissions, including the 1938-1941 Temporary National Economic Commission, the
1955 Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, the 1969 White
House Task Force on Antitrust Policy, the 1979 National Commission to Review Antitrust
Law and Procedures, and the 1998 International Competition Policy Advisory Committee.
10. Id. at 1031.
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on the appointment of Commissioners." l Third, the critical appoint-
ment would be that of the Chairperson, who is empowered to control
the Executive Director and the staff. As Commission members are
likely to be very busy part-timers, the staff would probably play a driv-
ing role on developing the agenda, priorities, spending choices, and
Report wording.1 2 Fourth, the ability to hold a large number of meet-
ings, hear substantial amounts of testimony, retain specialized experts,
and recruit a top quality staff would be influenced by the funding.
Congress authorized a total of four million dollars for three years,
which will presumably be doled out in annual appropriations.1 3
This is not the first blue ribbon antitrust study commission.1 4 In-
deed, over the past seventy years, a new commission seems to have
been born roughly once every generation. Some commissions have
been established by Congress,1 5 while some have been established by
the Executive Branch.' 6 Their durations and resources have widely va-
ried. Their assignments have sometimes been broad and sometimes
been narrow. 17 Rarely have they had an immediate impact on legisla-
tion, but sometimes their long-term impact has been significant.18 For
example, the Temporary National Economic Commission ("TNEC")
focused its attention on the role of industrial concentration, leading
to the Celler-Kefauver amendments to the Clayton Act nine years
later.19
The TNEC membership was evenly balanced between the Admin-
istration and Congress. 20 The AMC, on the other hand, is made up of
experts but does not include any Senators or members of Congress.
When the AMC Report ("Report") is eventually submitted, there will
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1031-32.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 1029.
15. For example, the Temporary National Economic Commission (1938-1941). See id.
at 1032-36.
16. For example, the National Commission for Review of Antitrust Laws and Proce-
dures (1977-79). See id. at 1041-44.
17. The National Commission for Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures (1977-79)
was ordained to cover only two main policy areas: the unreasonable protraction of complex
antitrust cases and reevaluation of existing immunities and exceptions from antitrust laws.
On the other hand, the White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy (1967-69) was
an open-ended vehicle aimed at information gathering and identification of the most im-
portant areas for reform. See id. at 1039, 1042.
18. See id. at 1046-47.
19. See RudolphJ.R. Peritz, COMPETITION POUCv IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW
158-59 (rev. ed. 2000).
20. See Foer, Perspective, supra note 9, at 1033.
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be no politicians with any foreseeable buy-in to the Report, other than
Congressman Sensenbrenner. However, Congressman Sensenbrenner
is not a member of the AMC and, because of term limits adopted by
the Republicans, will not even be Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee when the Report is submitted.
II. The Game Plan for the First Half
A. Getting Organized
The first task of any study commission is to make the transition
from statutory framework to physical reality. Appointments to the
AMC were required to be made within sixty days of enactment of the
law, and the three-year clock was to start running with the first meet-
ing of the Commission. 21 The AMC appointment process was appar-
ently not on the top of any politician's priority list because the
appointments were not completed for sixteen months.22 Indeed, the
Commission's charter could not be filed until April 2, 2004. On June
28, 2004, the AMC issued its first press release, announcing the identi-
fication of the Chairperson (Deborah A. Garza) and the Vice
Chairperson (Jonathan R. Yarowsky), the membership, and the sched-
ule for its first public meeting. 23 Ms. Garza is a partner in the Wash-
ington D.C. office of Fried Frank. 24 The press release also announced
21. Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002 ("The Act"), Pub. L. No. 107-
273, §§ 11054(e), 11058, 116 Stat. 1856, 1859 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 note). The
charter is found at Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Charter, http://www.amc.gov/pdf/
charter/amc charter.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2006). The Commission goes out of existence
thirty days after the Report is submitted. Id. § 11059.
22. The last appointments were announced by the President on March 5, 2004 (Den-
nis W. Carlton of Illinois, Deborah A. Garza of the District of Columbia to be Designate
Chairman upon appointment, Sanford M. Litvack of New York, and Deborah P. Majoras of
Virginia). See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Personnel Announcement (Mar. 5,
2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040305-5.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
23. See Press Release, Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Antitrust Modernization
Commission Announces First Public Meeting and Appointment of Executive Director and
General Counsel (June 28, 2004), available at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/news/press-re-
lease040628.pdf.
24. When Ms. Garza joined Fried Frank in 2001, Charles (Rick) Rule, head of Fried
Frank's antitrust practice said:
I'm thrilled that Deb has chosen to join the firm. She is one of the best antitrust
lawyers of her generation. At the Justice Department, she helped to develop en-
forcement policies, particularly in the area of merger review, that guide the Anti-
trust Division today. In private practice, she has been involved in some of the
major antitrust matters of the past two decades, including the representation of
Exxon in its merger with Mobil and the representation of the National Football
League in its landmark litigation with the United States Football League. By at-
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the appointment of Andrew J. Heimert as Executive Director and
General Counsel. 25 Mr. Heimert had been an attorney in the FTC's
Office of Policy and Coordination within the Bureau of Competition.
The first public meeting was held on July 15, 2004,26 and the Commis-
sioners announced that the final Report would be submitted in April
2007.27
Once the Chair had appointed Heimert as Executive Director,
the AMC needed to complete a variety of logistical tasks, such as the
hiring of staff, finding a location for a physical office, compliance with
the usual range of administrative filings, and establishment of a web-
site. 28 Staff biographies may be found on the website. 29
The first meeting opened with remarks by Congressman Sensen-
brenner, the legislative father of the Commission.30 In this and subse-
quent meetings, the AMC created "working groups" to suggest topics
for study and called for public comments once the topics were se-
lected. On January 8, 2005, the Commission identified an initial slate
of twenty-five topics for study.31 These selections were eventually re-
vised, and individual Commissioners were named to work on particu-
tracting Deb to become a leader in our antitrust department, Fried Frank has
taken a major step in its effort to build the preeminent antitrust practice.
Press Release, Fried Frank, Garza Joins Fried Frank as Antitrust Partner (Feb. 20, 2001),
available at http://www.fflhsj.com/pressreleases/garza.htm.
25. The Chair appoints the Executive Director, subject to approval by the Commis-
sioners. Antitrust Modernization Comm'n Act § 11056(a)(1). There is nothing on the re-
cord indicating that this appointment came to a vote.
26. See Press Release, Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Antitrust Modernization
Commission Holds First Public Meeting, Seeks Public Comment on Topics for Study, and
Unveils Website (July 16, 2004), available at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/news/press release
040716.pdf.
27. Id.
28. Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Home Page, http://www.amc.gov [hereinafter
AMC Home Page] (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
29. The staff consists of the Executive Director and General Counsel (Andrew J.
Heimert), two counsels (William F. Adkinson, Jr. and Todd Anderson), an economist
(Michael W. Klass), two senior advisors (William E. Kovacic and Alan J. Meese), a law clerk
(Hiram Andrews), and a paralegal (Kristin M. Gorzelany). Mr. Anderson departed at the
beginning of 2006. Mr. Kovacic was nominated and confirmed for a Republican seat on the
Federal Trade Commission and apparently played only a limited role on the AMC staff.
AMC Staff Bios, supra note 7.
30. The transcript of this meeting may be found at Antitrust Modernization Commis-
sion, Public Meeting, available at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/transcript040715.
pdf. Records relating to all public meetings are available on the AMC's website. Antitrust
Modernization Comm'n, Commission Meetings, http://www.amc.gov/commissionmeet-
ings.htm.
31. See Press Release, Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Antitrust Modernization
Commission Selects Initial Slate of Issues for Study (Jan. 18, 2005), http://www.amc.gov/
pdf/news/press-release05Oll9.pdf.
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lar "study groups."32 The Chair did not appoint official leaders of any
study group.3 3 The function of the study groups was to review the testi-
mony and public comments on the specific topics and to make recom-
mendations to the full AMC as to what policies should be adopted for
the final Report.3 4 While the Commission as a whole was shaped to
function in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act 35
("FACA'), the Commission initially took the position that study
groups are not covered by the Act and can therefore meet and act in
private. When challenged by the American Antitrust Institute, how-
ever, the Chair, speaking for the Commission, advised that during the
second half of the AMC's life, the study groups would not deliberate
on policy issues or make recommendations to the Commission.3 6
B. Developing the Agenda
How might a study commission, whose only assignment is to
make recommendations relating to the possible modernization of an-
titrust, structure its agenda? Answering this question was the first ma-
jor task of the AMC. One approach would be to begin with extensive
data collection. "Modernization" presumably implies that some cir-
cumstances of importance to antitrust have changed and that these
changes now require antitrust to also change by taking "modern" de-
velopments into account. Thus, one might start by comparing relevant
aspects of the past political economy with the present political econ-
omy and perhaps with predictions about the future. Only after this
task had been accomplished would the Commission then turn to pol-
icy recommendations. This approach was used by the TNEC, whose
multivolume picture of the economy during the Great Depression was
32. See Memorandum from Andrew Heimert, Executive Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Anti-
trust Modernization Comm'n, to All Commissioners (Feb. 25, 2005), available at http://
www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/list-of-study-groups~rev.pdf (regarding "Study Groups").
33. At any early stage, these were deemed "working groups," and leaders were ap-
pointed, but once the specific topics were selected for study, the AMC's membership was
assigned to leaderless "study groups." To not appoint what would in effect be subcommit-
tee chairs might be viewed as a management decision to retain centralized control. In any
event, it deprived the study groups of a formal leader with responsibility for developing
and shepherding a program.
34. See Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Transcript of Meeting 5 (Jan. 13, 2005),
available at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/transcript0501l3.pdf [hereinafter AMC
Meeting Transcript].
35. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2000).
36. See Memorandum from Albert A. Foer, President, Am. Antitrust Inst., to Am. Anti-
trust Inst. Advisory Bd. (Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/re-
cent2/487.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2006) (regarding "Transparency and Process at the
Antitrust Modernization Commission").
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called by one historian "the most dramatic and sweeping investigation
of American industry ever undertaken." 37 This model of surveying the
landscape is what the author recommended to the AMC.38
Nevertheless, the TNEC did not have an immediate impact. As
Alan Brinkley put it, "It had gathered the data. It would be up to
others to decide how to use it."' 39 Thus, a different approach-target-
ing delimited objectives-might seem more compelling to those who
know what they want to achieve and are anxious to show results. Prior
antitrust study commissions, such as the National Commission for Re-
view of Antitrust Laws and Procedures (1977-79) and the Interna-
tional Competition Advisory Committee (1998-2000), are examples
of the use of the targeting approach, in that their charters were more
carefully delimited. The AMC, so lacking in statutory direction, de-
cided to define its agenda by selecting for itself the specific questions
that it would attempt to answer.
At its first public meeting on July 15, 2004, the AMC decided to
solicit public comments on what issues it should study.40 While waiting
for comments, it would reach out to the "consumer, business, aca-
demic, legal, and enforcement communities" 41 for further enlighten-
ment. At its second meeting-not scheduled untilJanuary 10, 2005-
it would decide what issues to study. Someone must have noticed that
the clock was ticking, because the next meeting was actually held on
October 20, 2004.42 At this meeting, eight working groups were estab-
lished, and each Commissioner was appointed to serve on two or
more groups.43 The Executive Director reported that more than
thirty-five individuals and organizations contributed public com-
ments.44 Finally, the AMC determined that the working groups, each
37. SUSAN WAGNER, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 81 (Ernest S. Griffith & Hugh
Langdon Elsbree eds., 1971).
38. Foer, Perspective, supra note 9, at 1047-50.
39. ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM 127 (Alan A. Knopf 1995) (1966).
40. See Memorandum from Deborah Garza et al., to Comm'rs, Antitrust Moderniza-
tion Comm'n (July 14, 2004), available at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/news/commentsproc
_..memo2.pdf (regarding "Proposed Process for Soliciting Public Input and Timeline for
Preliminary Identification of Issues for Further Commission Study").
41. Id.
42. Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Meeting Minutes (Oct. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/minutes041020.pdf [AMC Meeting Minutes].
43. The working groups were for: Mergers, Acquisitions andJoint Ventures; Civil Pro-
cedures and Remedies; Criminal Procedures and Remedies; Immunities and Exemptions;
Regulated Industries; Intellectual Property; International Antitrust; and Single Firm Con-
duct. Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Working Group Assignments, available at http://
www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/wgassignmentsoutline.pdf.
44. AMC Meeting Minutes, supra note 42.
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under an appointed leader, would circulate recommendations to the
full Commission by December 17. The AMC would vote upon these
recommendations at the next meeting, now scheduled for January
2005.
45
At last, on January 13, 2005, the Commissioners took up a litany
of specific questions prepared by the various working groups.46 After
introductions by the working group leaders, the Commissioners voted
to take up twenty-nine questions, ranging from broad and controver-
sial questions, such as "What should be the remedies and legal liabili-
ties in private antitrust proceedings?" and "How does the current
intellectual property regime affect competition?" to relatively simple
and uncontroversial questions, such as "Should section 3 of the Robin-
son-Patman Act (relating to criminal penalties) be repealed?" A few
questions were deferred for further discussion.
The next public meeting, on March 24, attracted eight Commis-
sioners and an audience of fifty, and it lasted a mere twenty-five min-
utes.47 It had been scheduled to deal with only two matters that had
been deferred. 48 The first matter was whether to study the topic of
timetables for criminal and civil non-merger antitrust investigations by
the FTC and Department of Justice ("DOJ") .49 The Commissioners
voted not to make this a separate issue for study, but to address the
issue in the final Report they will submit to Congress. 50
The second question was somewhat more sensitive. Assistant At-
torney General Hewitt Pate had sent a letter to the AMC urging it to
undertake or design a comprehensive empirical study of the costs and
benefits of antitrust enforcement. 51 The Commissioners found them-
selves in the position of not wanting to offend the DOJ but, having
already publicly committed themselves to an overwhelming menu of
tasks, were reluctant to also undertake the type of comprehensive
study being proposed. The Commissioners voted unanimously not to
undertake the DOJ study, but rather to "undertake more limited em-
pirical studies where appropriate as part of its consideration of issues
45. Id.
46. See Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Meeting Minutes (Jan. 13, 2005), available
at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/minutes050ll3.pdf.
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selected for further study and identify areas in which further empirical
research could be useful."52
During the ensuing period, the AMC reviewed the approved
study questions and reorganized the questions under slightly different
topics, and "study groups" replaced "working groups" with Commis-
sioners each assigned to one or more study groups. Each group pro-
duced a "study plan" that was reviewed and voted upon at the fifth
public meeting on May 9.53 The adoption of nine study plans followed
(Enforcement Institutions, Exclusionary Conduct, Immunities and Ex-
emptions, International Antitrust, Merger Enforcement, New Econ-
omy, Regulated Industries, Remedies, and Robinson-Patman), with an
agreement to publish them in the Federal Register with a request for
public comments. 54
Each study plan listed the issues adopted for study and a series of
questions for public comment. For example, the Enforcement Institu-
tions Study Plan posed three questions about dual federal merger en-
forcement, four questions about differential merger enforcement
standards, four questions about the allocation of merger enforcement
among states, private plaintiffs, and federal agencies, and three ques-
tions about the role of states in enforcing non-merger antitrust laws.55
The plan also called for four (or possibly five) separate hearings with
panels of witnesses.5 6 The AMC adopted a tenth study plan, Criminal
Issues, at the sixth meeting on July 28, 2005.57 Altogether, the ten
study plans contained 176 separate questions and called for twenty-
nine separate hearings.
The issues not placed on the table are as important as those that
were. This Article has already shown that the AMC rejected both a
large-scale view of antitrust within the context of a changing political
economy and comprehensive empirical projects. 58 Also, the AMC did
not take up a number of important and hody debated questions in the
52. Id.
53. See Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Meeting Minutes (May 9, 2005), available at
http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/minutes050509.pdf.
54. Id.
55. See Memorandum from Enforcement Institutions Study Group to All Commission-
ers, available at http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/enforcement-institutions-study-plan.
pdf (regarding "Enforcement Institutions Study Plan").
56. Id.
57. See Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Meeting Minutes (July 28, 2005), available at
http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/Minutes050728.pdf.
58. See supra text accompanying note 38.
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antitrust community relating to the purposes and goals of antitrust,59
the role of concentration,60 how to deal with power buyers, 61 the
problem of patent ambush, 62 and reform of the antidumping laws.63
From April 2, 2004 (the filing of the charter) until May 9, 2005
(approval of the study plans), more than one-third of the AMC's life
had been spent on organization and deciding what issues to study.
While the result cannot be evaluated until after the Report is written,
one may question whether more efficient use could have been made
of the first year and whether the particular set of questions adopted
represents the best strategy for determining what, if anything, needs
to be "modernized."
Insofar as has been revealed in public meetings, the approach
selected by this panel of eleven lawyers and one economist is heavily
legalistic. The Commission itself has neither undertaken nor con-
tracted for new research. 64 If new information is to be taken into ac-
count, it will probably have to be furnished by the public, through
formal comments or testimony. According to AMC staff, the single
example of the Commission formally reaching out to stimulate volun-
teer consultants to produce desired research was the assignment given
to Darren Bush (University of Houston Law Center), Gregory Leo-
nard (NERA Economic Consulting), and Stephen Ross (University of
59. For a review of the debate over the proper goals of antitrust, see Albert A. Foer,
The Goals of Antitrust: Thoughts on Consumer Welfare in the U.S. (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working
Paper No. 05-09, 2005), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/350.pdf
[hereinafter Foer, Goals of Antitrust].
60. For a review of current issues relating to the role of concentration, see Press Re-
lease, Albert A. Foer, President, Am. Antitrust Inst., AAI Issues Statement on Mergers and
Concentration Critical of Current Policies (Feb. 10, 2004), available at http://www.antitrust
institute.org/recent2/296.cfm.
61. The AAI conducted a symposium on power buyers and antitrust, the papers of
which were presented in a symposium issue of the A.B.A.'s Antitrust Law Journal For an
overview, see Albert A. Foer, Introduction to Symposium on Buyer Power and Antitrust, 72 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 505, 505-08 (2005).
62. See Letter from Robert Barr, Vice President, Worldwide Patent Counsel, Cisco Sys.,
& Gil Ohana, Dir., Antitrust & Competition, Cisco Sys., to Andrew J. Heimert, Executive
Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Antitrust Modernization Comm'n (Jan. 7, 2005), available at http://
www.amc.gov/comments/pubsubmissions/cisco.pdf.
63. See AM. ANTITRUST INST., COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE WORK-
ING GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 4 (2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/public_
studiesjfr28902/international_pdf/050715_AAI_International.pdf.
64. Prior blue ribbon antitrust commissions had sometimes contracted out for spe-
cific research or had been able to assign specific research to government agencies with
expertise. The AMC's statute permitted these strategies, at the discretion of the Commis-
sion. Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, §§ 11056(b),
11507(d), 116 Stat. 1856, 1858-59 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 note).
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Illinois College of Law) to prepare a framework for policymakers to
analyze proposed and existing antitrust exemptions and immunities. 65
C. The Role of the Public
The AMC's outreach until this point in time has reflected four
phases: the informal seeking of suggestions from antitrust notables, a
request for public comments on setting the agenda, the request for
public comments on topics selected by the Commission for study, and
public hearings.
1. Informal Outreach
Prior to its first public meeting, the Commission determined that
it would initially reach out informally to the antitrust community for
ideas about how to proceed and what topics to focus on. I was person-
ally scheduled to visit with the Commission at its new offices for such a
discussion. It turned out to be a one-hour unstructured conversation
that included the Executive Director and three Commissioners who
participated by conference call. There appears to be no public record
of who else participated in this initial outreach program, nor is it clear
whether other conversations were more productive than mine.
2. Request for Comments on the Agenda
On July 23, 2004, the Commission asked for public comments by
September 30 on what issues it should study.66 Thirty-eight comments
were received. 67 Some comments, like those of the American Antitrust
Institute ("AAI") and the American Bar Association ("ABA") Antitrust
Section, 68 were broadly based; others dealt with specific issues of par-
ticular interest to the authors, such as the American Homeowners
Grassroots Alliance, which was principally concerned with antitrust is-
sues relating to the real estate industry, or the Americans for Tax Re-
form. "[A] ntitrust laws, if they ever served a useful purpose, now only
65. This framework was presented at hearings on December 1, 2005, to elicit reaction
from panelists and Commissioners. Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Commission Hear-
ings, Statutory Immunities and Exemptions (Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.amc.
gov/commission-hearings/statutory-immunitiesexemptions.htm.
66. Antitrust Modernization Commission Request for Public Comment, 69 Fed. Reg.
43,969 (July 23, 2004).
67. Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, List of Public Comments, http://www.amc.
gov/commission-study-issues.htm.
68. Ronan P. Harty, The Antitrust Modernization Commission: An Introduction, ANTITRUST
SOURCE, Nov., 2004, at 3, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/source/11-04/Nov
04-Hartyl 129.pdf.
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exist to stifle productivity growth and development of new products
and services. 69
After the Commission made its initial cut on topics for study, an-
other eleven public comments were submitted, unsolicited. Five of
these urged the Commission to reconsider its decision not to include
the patent ambush issues. 70 Five urged the Commission not to attempt
to reevaluate antidumping laws.71 The eleventh criticized the Commis-
sion for not being responsive to public comments. 72 The Commission
did respond, however, to the politicians' concerns that it lacked both
the specific expertise and the statutory mandate to take up antidump-
ing, by removing this subject from the agenda of topics.
3. Request for Public Comments on Substance
On May 19, 2005, the AMC requested that the public provide
comments byJune 17, July 1, orJuly 15, 2005, depending on the topic
for the first nine study plans. 73 In effect, this meant that an organiza-
tion wishing to respond to all 176 questions in a timely fashion would
have no more than four to six weeks to prepare all of its comments.
Given that most organizations would require time to do research,
write thoughtful comments, and clear them through any sort of com-
mittee or internal review process, this hardly seemed to be a welcom-
ing invitation.
Ninety-four comments were filed in a timely fashion, with another
twenty-nine filed by the end of October.74 However, these numbers
are misleading. Sixty-one of the 110 filings related to the Immunities
and Exemptions Study Plan, and most of these were submitted by in-
dustries wishing to maintain their own current exemptions and immu-
69. Letter from Grover G. Norquist, President, Ams. for Tax Reform, to Deborah A.
Garza, Chairman, Antitrust Modernization Comm'n (Sept. 9, 2004), available at http://
www.amc.gov/comments/americanstaxreform.pdf.
70. These comments were submitted by the AAI, Sun Microsystems, Cisco Systems,
Hewlett-Packard, and International Business Machines. Antitrust Modernization Comm'n,
Public Comment, http://www.amc.gov/public-submissions.htm (last visited, Feb. 7, 2006).
71. These comments were submitted by Senators Specter and DeWine, Congressman
English, Congressmen Rangel and Conyers, Senator Byrd, and the Committee to Support
United States Trade Laws. Id.
72. Letter from Carl Lundgren, Relpromax Antitrust Inc., to the Antitrust Moderniza-
tion Comm'n (Jan. 11, 2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/comments/pubsubmis-
sions/relpromax.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
73. Antitrust Modernization Commission Request for Public Comment, 70 Fed. Reg.
28,902, 28,902-07 (May 19, 2005).
74. Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Public Comment, http://www.amc.gov/
public-studies.htm.
Spring 2006] AMC SYMPOSIUM
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
nities.75 Moreover, of the remaining submissions, ten were submitted
by the AAI, four were submitted by the International Chamber of
Commerce, and three were submitted by sections of the ABA.76
The AAI, an independent non-profit organization, had prepared
for the AMC by establishing volunteer working groups to parallel the
AMC's study groups. With a streamlined internal review process and
the flexibility to allow each working group to submit comments under
its own identification, the AAI could address in some depth nearly all
of the questions posed by the AMC. 77
It is anticipated that the Antitrust Section of the ABA will provide
comments comparable in breadth. Working groups were established
by the Antitrust Section to comment on various topics, but because
the ABA's internal procedures proved sufficiently cumbersome, the
first comments did not arrive at the AMC before late October 2005.78
An example would be the fourteen page, single-spaced filing on Octo-
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. The Author served on every AAI working group and edited all papers to provide
consistency both in formatting and in overall substantive positioning. Each paper repre-
sented a consensus of its working group, ascertained through telephone conferences and
e-mail exchanges, but there were no votes taken, and no one member should be assumed
necessarily to agree with all statements in the comments. The timing imposed by the AMC
severely limited the potential for in-depth legal or economic research. Thus, the only AAI
comment that provided new empirical data was the Comment on Criminal Remedies, in
which attention was called to information that had recently been published by Professors
John Connor and Robert Lande (two members of a working group chaired by attorney
Kenneth Adams), showing that the harm caused by cartel pricing was significantly greater
than previously thought. AM. ANTITRUST INST., COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST IN-
STITUTE WORKING GROUP ON CRIMINAL REMEDIES (2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/
public.studiesjfr28902/criminal-pdf/050930 AAICriminalRemedies.pdf.
For a flavor of these comments, see, for example, AM. ANTITRUST INST., COMMENTS OF
THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE'S WORKING GROUP ON THE NEW ECONOMY (2005), avail-
able at http://www.amc.gov/public-studies fr28902/new-economy-pdf/050715_AAI-New
_Economy.pdf.
The working group, which included at least four antitrust law professors who teach
courses on high technology or intellectual property law, was chaired by Professor Rudolph
Peritz of the New York Law School. The other members were Joseph Bauer (law professor,
Notre Dame), Michael Carrier (law professor, Rutgers, Camden), Albert Foer (attorney,
AAI), Philip Nelson (economist, Economists, Inc.), Roger Noll (economist, Stanford),
Mark Patterson (law professor, Fordham), Douglas Rosenthal (attorney, then with Sonnen-
schein, Nath & Rosenthal), Jonathan Rubin (attorney and economist, AAI), F.M. Scherer
(economist, Harvard), Robert Skitol (attorney, Drinker Biddle & Reath), and Philip Weiser
(law professor, University of Colorado). Id.
78. Letter from Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Antitrust Law, to Antitrust Modernization
Comm'n (Oct. 19, 2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/publicstudies-fr28902/en-
forcement_pdf/051019_ABAGovtEnfStatesRoles-EnfIInst.pdf (regarding "Comments
Regarding Government Enforcement Institutions: The Enforcement Role of the States
with Respect to Federal Antitrust Laws").
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ber 19 by Section Chairman Donald C. Klawiter, titled "The Enforce-
ment Role of the States with Respect to Federal Antitrust Laws."'79 On
two of the more controversial issues addressed, the Antitrust Section's
comments can be described as mild. "Absent a valid empirical basis,"
the Antitrust Section stated that it was "unwilling to recommend dra-
matic changes to the system of dual federal-state merger enforcement
or to discount the criticisms of the system as it currently operates. 8 0
On the question of whether private enforcement should continue to
be available to challenge mergers, the Antitrust Section suggested that
the AMC "should not take any action to encourage or discourage any
change to the system."81
4. Hearings
As of the end of October 2005, the AMC had held hearings on six
topics: Indirect Purchaser Actions, the Robinson-Patman Act, Civil
Remedies Issues, the State Action Doctrine, Exclusionary Conduct,
and State Enforcement Institutions. 82 The AMC scheduled nine addi-
tional hearings before the information phase of the Commission's
planned activity ends in January, 2006: Criminal Remedies, Federal
Enforcement Institutions, New Economy, Merger Enforcement, Gov-
ernment Civil Remedies, Statutory Immunities and Exemptions, Regu-
lated Industries, Noerr-Pennington Issues, and International Issues.83
The original plan called for twenty-nine hearings, which was probably
twice as many as the Commissioners could actually handle, consider-
ing their on-going full-time professional responsibilities.
The typical AMC hearing involves a panel of four witnesses seated
at a table facing the arrayed Commissioners. After a brief welcome
from Chairperson Garza, the four witnesses, whose written statements
are distributed beforehand, are each given five minutes to summarize
their statements. The AMC designates one Commissioner as the lead
questioner. After he or she has asked a series of questions, every other
Commissioner is provided time to ask questions of any or all of the
panelists. Similar to an appellate judge, questioning is often the way a
Commissioner signals his or her perspective. However, thus far it has
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1.
81. Id. at 3.
82. See Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Hearings, http://www.amc.gov/commis-
sionhearings/pdf/Hearings_-Schedule.pdf (revised Oct. 17, 2005).
83. Id. For a timetable of the Commission's activities, see Antitrust Modernization
Comm'n, Timetable, http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/amc timeline05O330.pdf (last
visited Feb. 7, 2006).
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proven difficult to predict where most Commissioners will come out
when votes are eventually taken.
A hearing usually lasts two hours. The full transcript is published
after some delay and editing on the AMC's website.8 4 With only four
witnesses on a given topic, all viewpoints will obviously not be heard.
Although the Commission has attempted to construct panels that re-
present several different constituencies in a generally balanced way,
some efforts (e.g., exclusionary conduct and mergers) appear to have
been less successful than others (e.g., treble damages).
By and large, very little if any "new" information has thus far been
provided at the hearings. Instead, they are primarily occasions for
well-informed advocates to promote previously developed positions re-
lating to the matters before them. Some Commissioners (notablyJohn
Shenefield, who had chaired an earlier blue ribbon antitrust study
commission) have made it a point to illuminate areas of consensus
and difference within the panels.
Thus, during the first half of its statutory life, the AMC organized
itself, developed an agenda, obtained written public comments, and
conducted various hearings. No policy recommendations had been
decided, and it appeared that a lot of heavy lifting lay ahead.
III. The Second Half
A. The Timetable
As the Commission returns to the field to play the second half,
what remains to be accomplished? By the end of February 2006, the
staff is expected to have compiled summaries of the research and in-
formation gathered.85 From March through May, the study groups
and staff will prepare options for recommendations, and the Commis-
sion will begin meeting to deliberate on findings and recommenda-
tions.8 6 A draft Report and recommendations are anticipated to be
completed in August, and the Report should be finalized in Decem-
ber.8 7 The final printed Report is scheduled for release on April 2,
2007.
Among the important procedural questions that still need to be
answered are: (1) Will the study group meetings in which recommen-
84. AMC Home Page, supra note 28.
85. These plans were announced by the Chair at the January 13, 2005 meeting. See
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dations are initially formulated and debated be open to the public?,
(2) When will the Report drafts be released to the public (and will
they be released as soon as prepared or all at once)? (3) Will the pub-
lic have an opportunity for meaningful input once draft materials are
available?, and (4) How will the Report handle dissents and individual
statements by Commissioners?
B. What Is at Stake?
Out of the 176 questions targeted by the Commission, a few clus-
ters are likely to prove most controversial and potentially important
for the future of antitrust. I will call attention to seven of these.
1. Role of the States
The role of the state Attorneys General as antitrust enforcers has
a long history, going back before the Sherman Act 88 in some states.
However, it became much more salient during the Reagan Adminis-
tration, a period when federal antitrust was in severe retrenchment.
The fact that many of the states disagreed with the DOJ (not to men-
tion Microsoft Corp.) in this generation's landmark monopolization
case led to complaints that the states were an unnecessary complica-
tion and that they should be made to bow out of any cases involving
interstate commerce. In the alternative, the states should bow out of
any cases in which the federal antitrust enforcers had reviewed a mat-
ter or, had taken formal enforcement action. 89
State representatives were rather pointedly left off of the AMC
and have no obvious representative within the membership. Recogniz-
ing this disadvantage, the states and their coordinating arm, the Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General, have been gathering data to
demonstrate their importance within the overall scheme of antitrust
enforcement and that the system is not broken. Some of this informa-
tion was presented by Professor Harry First in his testimony to the
Commission on October 26.90 Based on questioning by the Commis-
sioners, one could surmise that most at risk may be the states' jurisdic-
88. The Sherman Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. For state histories, see MARTINJ.
SKLAR, THE CoRPoR.ATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916, at 93-105
(1988).
89. See, e.g., RIcHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 281 (2d ed. 2001).
90. Allocation of Antitrust Enforcement Between the States and the Federal Government: Hear-
ing Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n (2005) (statement of Harry First, Professor of
Law, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law), available at http://www.amc.gov/commission-hearings/pdf/
Statement-First.pdf. This presentation can be considered an exception to the generaliza-
tion that very little "new" information has been provided to the AMC by witnesses.
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tion over mergers impacting more than one state, which is to say, most
mergers.
The AAI working group advocated that the states maintain their
current jurisdiction over mergers. More generally, it stressed the sig-
nificant contributions made by the concurrent enforcement of anti-
trust laws by state and federal agencies, and it opposed any plan for
imposed allocation of authority. 91
2. Private Enforcement
It is estimated that over 90% of antitrust litigation is by private
parties. 92 Both the statutory scheme and common law have combined
to encourage antitrust litigants in certain ways, most notably through
treble damages, joint and several liability, the no-contribution rule,
and attorney fees for victorious plaintiffs. Perhaps in response, courts
and Congress have adopted various techniques for making life more
difficult for plaintiffs, such as the requirements for standing,93 anti-
trust injury,94 and evidentiary presumptions.95 While virtually no one
is advocating for the elimination of private actions, the defense bar
and their clients have long been interested in finding additional ways
to tie the hands of plaintiffs.
Among the ideas raised during the AMC's hearings are: (1) re-
duction of the circumstances under which treble damages are
mandatory (e.g., applying them only to more serious per se cases such
as horizontal price fixing or allowing the court to decide after trial
whether to multiply damages), (2) eliminating joint and several liabil-
ity and the no-contribution rule (thereby reducing plaintiffs' leverage
to gain favorable settlements), and (3) allowing fee-shifting so that the
loser will pay the attorneys' fees for both sides (as opposed to the cur-
rent rule that the liable defendant pays the plaintiffs' attorneys
fees).96 Because a high proportion of plaintiffs' antitrust cases are
brought on a contingent fee basis, any of these changes could affect
91. AM. ANTITRUST INST., COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE WORKING
GROUP ON ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS (2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/public_
studies-fr28902/enforcementpdf/050715 AAIEnforcjInst.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
92. ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KovAcic, ANTITRUST LAw AND ECONOMICS 462
(West Group 4th ed., 1994).
93. See generally Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the
Barriers for Antitrust Injury and Standing, 62 U. PIT. L. REv. 437 (2001).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See generally Civil Remedies Issues: Hearing Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n




the cost-benefit analysis that determines whether a private case will be
brought. For example, elimination of treble damages would reduce
the payoff for a victory (and likely reduce the starting point for settle-
ment negotiations). Thus, both plaintiff lawyers and consumers-
neither of whom are represented on the Commission-are concerned
about what the AMC will recommend.
The AAI working group's comments argued against modifying
the treble damage rule or making any procedural changes relating to
civil antitrust remedies, other than to support the introduction of pre-
judgment interest. The working group supported continuation of
awarding legal fees to a successful plaintiff and opposed changing the
current rules relating to joint and several liability, contribution, and
claim reduction.97
3. Damages for Indirect Purchasers
Ever since the Supreme Court's Illinois Brick Co. v Illinois98 opin-
ion in 1977, there has been controversy over whether indirect pur-
chasers (most often, classes of consumers) should be permitted to
seek damages in antitrust cases. Roughly half of the consumers in the
nation have the right to sue for such damages under what are known
as State Illinois Brick Repealer laws.99
Various groups, including an ABA task force, have advocated
some form of federal statute to provide for a single federal court to
handle such cases, with (or perhaps without) preemption of state indi-
rect purchaser laws. 100 The AMC considers this complex issue so im-
portant that it allocated the subject two panels of five witnesses
each. 101
The AAI working group agreed that states need to be allowed to
have laws to protect indirect purchasers. It recommended that there
97. See Am. ANTITRUST INST., COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE WORK-
ING GROUP ON REMEDIES (2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/public-studies-fr28902/
remediespdf/AAI Remedies.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
98. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
99. See generally Daniel R. Karon, "Your Honor, Tear Down That Illinois Brick Wall!" The
National Movement Toward Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Standing and Consumer Justice, 30 Wm.
MITCHELL L. REv. 1351 (2004).
100. See State Indirect Purchaser Actions: Proposals for Reform: Hearing Before the Antitrust
Modernization Comm'n (2005) (statement of Michaell Denger, Partner and Co-Chair, Anti-
trust & Trade Regulation Practice Group, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP), available at
http://www.amc.gov/commission-hearings/pdf/Denger.pdf.
101. Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, Commission Documents, Commission Hear-
ings: Indirect Purchaser Actions, http://www.amc.gov/commission-hearings/indirect_
purchaser.htm.
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be an opportunity to evaluate the impact of the recently passed Class
Action Fairness Act'0 2 before any effort is made to enact further
reform. 103
4. Single Firm Conduct
Section 2 of the Sherman Act' 0 4 deals with monopolization and
attempts to monopolize. In recent years, a variety of cases, headed by
the Microsoft litigation and the Supreme Court's decision in Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Trinko'0 5 have inspired much conversation and
literature concerning the question of what strategies by a single firm,
acting alone, should be considered illegitimate.' 0 6 While it seems un-
likely that the AMC will propose legislative revisions, it could attempt
to provide expert guidance to courts and enforcers on standards for
applying section 2. This territory is hotly contested between tradition-
alists and conservatives, the former tending to support government
intervention and the latter tending to support non-interference.
The AAI working group urged that the appropriate standards
should be allowed to emerge through the normal playing out of the
common law.107 Moreover, it does not interpret Trinko as having
adopted any particular standard for treatment of refusals to deal.'08
The working group supports the continuing development of the es-
sential facilities doctrine. 0 9
5. Robinson-Patman Act
The Robinson-Patman Act" 0 ("R-P Act") outlaws certain types of
price discrimination. The R-P Act is one of the laws that may facilitate
control over power buyers, a phenomenon raising new levels of con-
cern as giant retailers like Wal-Mart emerge. However, the AMC did
102. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. (2005) (to be codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
103. AM. ANTITRUST INsT., supra note 97, at 18.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
105. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
106. For example, the DOJ and FTC have both scheduled hearings on single-firm con-
duct to begin in the spring of 2006. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC and DOJ to
Host Joint Public Hearings on Single-firm Conduct as Related to Competition, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/11/unilateral.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
107. AM. ANTITRUST INST., COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE WORKING
GROUP ON EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT 9-11 (2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/public
studiesfr28902/exclus-conduct.pdf/050715_AAI-Exclus.Conduct revd.pdf (last visited,
Feb. 7, 2006).
108. Id. at 17-20.
109. Id. at 23.
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (2000).
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not consider control over power buyers to be an issue worth consider-
ing in the process of modernizing. 111 The R-P Act has rarely been en-
forced at the federal level during the past thirty years, but it remains
in effect, helping to shape much domestic commerce, and is often the
subject of private litigation. Small business-which is not represented
on the Commission-adamantly supports continuation of the R-P Act
and its active enforcement. It appears likely that the AMC will recom-
mend revisions or outright repeal of the R-P Act. It will almost cer-
tainly recommend repeal of criminal jurisdiction under the R-P Act,
which is rarely if ever utilized and has few if any known supporters.
The AAI working group urged that the R-P Act be reformed, but
that it not be repealed, and suggested three ways in which it might be
made more consistent with contemporary ideas about antitrust
policy. 112
6. Mergers
While not taking on major questions about the purpose or effec-
tiveness of anti-merger laws, or even whether industrial concentration
itself should still be the basis of legal presumptions, the Commission
appears to be particularly interested in matters of process and admin-
istration. One major philosophical question may sneak in, however:
what role should efficiencies play in a merger antitrust case. In partic-
ular, there could be discussion of whether to apply the standard of
total welfare or consumer welfare, a technical but controversial issue
that calls into play the values underlying antitrust law.' 13
The AAI working group recommended against any changes in
the statutory framework of the merger laws, but urged that concentra-
tion should still play a major role in merger analysis. 14 Most members
of the working group supported the use of consumer welfare, as op-
posed to total welfare, as the standard for evaluating efficiency
claims.1 15
111. For an overview of buying power, see generally Symposium, Buyer Power and Anti-
trust, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 505 (2005).
112. AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT SHOULD BE REFORMED, NOT RE-
PEALED 2 (2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/public-studies-fr28902/Robinson-pat-
man-pdf/AAIR P ACT.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
113. See Foer, Goals of Antitrust, supra note 59, at 15-29.
114. AM. ANTITRUST INST., COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE WORKING
GROUP ON MERGER ENFORCEMENT 3 (2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/public_studies
_r28902/merger_pdf/050715_AAI-Merger.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
115. Id. at 9-10.
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7. Immunities and Exemptions
The AMC could in theory have taken evidence on each item in
the long list of statutory immunities and exceptions that limit the ap-
plicability of antitrust laws. It quickly became obvious that the Com-
mission did not have the time or resources to do this and that such an
undertaking would not likely lead to legislation. A different agenda
emerged, in which the AMC would try to develop a framework for
Congress to examine each new (or renewed) request for an immunity
or exemption. As mentioned previously, consultants are preparing
such a framework.116 Immunities and exemptions are generally the
result of political power exercised on behalf of an industry, with the
purpose of benefiting the industry rather than consumers. For this
reason, any ammunition that would assist Congress in standing more
firmly for the public interest would be desirable. It is conceivable that
Congress might legislate a framework for itself that its members could
point to when approached to support special interest antitrust legisla-
tion. This is potentially one of the most fruitful areas that the Commis-
sion has decided to pursue.
The AAI's working group urged creation of a methodology that,
if adopted by Congress, could force Congress to closely examine cer-
tain questions before enacting special interest legislation.117
C. Will Any of It Matter?
The history of blue ribbon antitrust commissions in general does
not suggest that the AMC's final Report will generate immediate legis-
lative action. This particular Commission does not have politicians on
board who are likely to champion enactment of the Report. Nor will
the one politician who has shown interest, James Sensenbrenner,
likely be in the privileged position as House Judiciary Committee
Chairman, where his own leverage could be particularly useful in
pushing forward a legislative agenda. This means that any legislative
recommendations of the Commission will have to carry their own
weight politically.
116. See supra text accompanying note 65.
117. See generally AM. ANTITRUST INST., COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTI-
TUTE WORKING GROUP ON IMMUNITIES AND EXEMPTIONS (2005), available at http://www.
amc.gov/public-studiesfr28902/immunities-exemptions-pdf/050715_AAI.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 6, 2006). The comments of the AAI Working Group on Immunities and Exemp-
tions were drafted primarily by Warren Grimes (Southwestern University School of Law)
and Darren Bush (University of Houston Law Center). Id. Professor Bush is one of the
three consultants requested by the AMC to develop and present the framework idea. See
supra text accompanying note 65.
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Whether any legislative action will occur likely depends upon: (1)
the substantive recommendations, (2) the style with which they are
put forward, (3) the general political atmosphere at the time, and (4)
who takes up the cause.
1. The Substantive Recommendations
It is too soon to know what substantive recommendations will be
made. The previous section outlined some of the potential recom-
mendations, e.g., a federal indirect purchaser law, modifications to
the R-P Act, or revisions in the role of state or private enforcement.
One can imagine that amending the R-P Act to knock out criminal
jurisdiction would generate neither significant opposition nor excited
support. However, a solution to the indirect purchaser problem has
evaded legislators for a long time, and modifications to state or private
enforcement or to the basic provisions of the R-P Act would likely stir
up a hornet's nest of opposition.
2. Style
By style, I am referring to (1) quality of presentation, (2) empha-
sis, and (3) the handling of dissent. The quality of presentation will
reflect organization and writing style. Will a committee style render
the final Report readable only by devoted experts? Antitrust is a diffi-
cult enough topic to present to the lay public. Given the large number
of topics and subtopics, many of which can only be of interest to ex-
perts, it will be a challenge to write something that will be read by
more than a handful of antitrust lawyers and economists. There is also
the matter of persuasiveness. How much information will be
presented and how persuasive will the analysis be?
A related problem is that with so many different topics and sub-
topics in play, it may be difficult for a reader to see the forest for the
trees. What message will come through? Will it be one that signals
things are basically all right, but the common law needs to keep devel-
oping? Or will it be one that suggests that so many things are wrong
that only severe surgery can save the economy? (I leave out a third
scenario, which seems eminently desirable to me but most unlikely:
that the Report will say that what is needed is more antitrust, aggres-
sively and creatively applied, to keep an evolving economy flexible,
innovative, and serving consumers with choice and competitive
prices).
Finally, how will the Report handle dissent? Will individual or
groups of Commissioners be inclined to write dissents? One route
Spring 2006] AMC SYMPOSIUM
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
would be to suppress dissent by only reporting majority recommenda-
tions and findings. Another option would be to only make recommen-
dations for which there is unanimity among the Commissioners. Since
this would likely result in a very brief report, the real question is how
much space to devote to disagreements. Should they merely be foot-
noted? Should dissenters be permitted adequate space to explain
their reasons? The latter may offend majoritarians, but is likely to
prove more useful in the long run. It would help to illuminate not
only the existence and reasons for disagreement, but the degree of
consensus that surrounds any given issue. A failure or refusal to incor-
porate conflicting information, interpretations, and recommenda-
tions into the Report would almost ensure that they will find their way
into the public light through other means, which may only undermine
the Report's credibility.
3. The Political Scene
The political landscape at the time the Report will be issued is an
unknown. A set of legislative recommendations decided upon in the
expectation of a conservative Republican Congress and White House
would very likely have a lesser chance of enactment if elections de-
velop a different picture. Unpredictable economic circumstances,
such as a depression or large-scale corporate scandals, could also have
a major impact. Depending upon the precise recommendations, vari-
ous interest groups can be expected to push back in the normal politi-
cal course of events.
4. Who Will Take Up the Cause?
I was asked by one of the Commissioners, "Why are the states, the
plaintiffs' bar, and consumers so intensely concerned about what we
are doing? All we can do is make recommendations."
The answer is that the Commission can start the ball rolling, and
no one knows where the momentum will take it. Lobbyists worry
about a bill being introduced because one day the bill (originally no
more than a recommendation) may become law, and many resources
will have to be spent trying to influence the course of the bill, whose
future passage, defeat, or form cannot prudently be taken for granted.
We do not know who will be making decisions about antitrust
two, five, or ten years from now, but ideas once put into circulation by
a credible blue ribbon commission might find champions in the
future.
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Moreover, the test of a blue ribbon commission's effectiveness is
not limited to legislation. The AMC's Report could influence the
other institutions that frequently play an even more important role
within the antitrust community-the federal and state enforcement
agencies, the courts, the antitrust bar, and academics.
As the AMC team comes back onto the field after a somewhat
slow first half, the antitrust crowd watches eagerly, hopeful for a fair,
spirited, and high quality contest of ideas.
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